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COMMENTS
EXTRADITION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
THE FUTURE OF THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE DOCTRINE
Christine E. Cervasio
PART I:
Introduction
"The efficacy of any kind of system of international criminal
law .. . requires that states accept an obligation either to try
international offenders before their own courts or to surrender
them for trial before a foreign (or international) court."1 This is
the extradition dilemma that has stumped nations for years.
Although every nation has varying rules on extradition, one ex-
ception that many nations agree upon is the political offense
doctrine. Generally, the political offense doctrine in extradition
law is the refusal of one country to extradite an accused or con-
victed individual if that person was to be tried on a crime of
political character. 2 Not only is the exception a unilateral dec-
1 M. CHERIF BASsIoUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE THE
DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW xi (1995).
2 See generally DR. CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE
EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER IX (1980).
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laration of national policy, 3 but it is also readily apparent in
many bilateral4 and multilateral treaties.5
The political offense doctrine serves as an exception to ex-
tradition when the crimes of the accused or convicted are inci-
dental to, or somehow connected with, political order in a
certain country. 6 This exception to extradition is raised by the
state to which the accused has fled, and is generally included in
extradition treaties.7 This exception has been termed "a double
edged sword" since it protects individuals from the possibility of
an unfair trial or cruel punishment, while at the same time it
grants immunity for individuals who have committed grave
crimes."
The introduction of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
opens a new door to concerns of international crimes. A neutral
judicial body will now prosecute crimes of grave nature such as
"crimes against humanity" and "the crime of genocide."9 Many
of the policy reasons behind the theory of the political offense
doctrine will cease to exist in this new body of law. 10 Is there a
future for the political offense exception in the ICC?
This comment will explore the political offense exception
and its future in the ICC. Part II will present a look into the
3 Some of the nations that include the political offense exception in their ex-
tradition treaties are: Brazil (Aliens Act, October 13, 1969, art. 88(vii)); Great Brit-
ain (Extradition Act, August 9, 1870, art. 3(1)); Ireland (Extradition Act, July 19,
1965, art. 11(1)); Italy (CONST., December 27, 1947, arts. 10 (4) and 26 (2); The
Netherlands (Extradition Act, March 9, 1967, art. 11(1)); Portugal (Decree No. 437/
75, August 16, 1975, art. 3(e)); Sweden (Extradition Act, December 6, 1957, art.6).
See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 1 n.1.
4 Great Britain and Belgium (Treaty between the United Kingdom and
Belgium for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, October 29, 1901, U.K.-
Belg., art. 7); United States of America and India (Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the United States of America and Government of the Republic of
India, June 25, 1997, U.S.-Ind., art. 4). See SIR EDWARD CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON
THE LAW OF EXTRADITION (Stevens and Haynes 1903).
5 Arab League Extradition Agreement, September 14, 1952, art. 4; Benelux
Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 27 1962,
art. 3; European Convention on Extradition, December 13, 1957, art. 3. See VAN
DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 2 n.9.
6 See BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (6' ed. 1990).
7 See e.g., supra notes 3-5.
8 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at ix.
9 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9* (1999) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
10 See infra Part II.
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history of extradition and the evolution of the political offense
doctrine. Part III will introduce the newly created ICC. Part IV
will critically analyze the political offense doctrine within the
framework of the Court. Finally, Part V will summarize why
the future looks bleak for the political offense exception in the
ICC.
PART II:
A. Statutory History of Extradition and the Evolution of the
Political Offense Doctrine
Perhaps the most precise definition of extradition is "[the
surrender by one state or country to another of an individual
accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being com-
petent to try and punish him, demands the surrender." 1 The
oldest extradition treaty was entered into by the Egyptian
Pharoah Ramses II and the Hittite Prince Hattusili. 12 The de-
velopment of extradition as we know it did not begin until the
eighteenth century, and then was itself considered an exception
to the tradition of asylum. 13
Historically, extraditable crimes were predominantly of a
political nature.' 4 Common criminals were not viewed as a
danger to society, so sovereigns rarely sought them.' 5 Persons
who acted against the state, however, were frequently pursued
and harshly punished.' 6 Asylum, in these cases, was only gran-
ted if it was to benefit the state.' 7 Asylum, therefore, was an
exception to extradition.' 8
This practice changed with the evolution of time and the
international order. Extradition became the norm, with the
granting of asylum considerably limited.' 9 Along with this
change came the notion of the political offense exception. The
eighteenth century, filled with revolutions and accompanied by
11 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 585.
12 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 4 n.17.
13 See id. at 4.
14 See id. at 5.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2.
18 See id.
19 See id. at rx.
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a frequent political uprising mentality, beset a new attitude to-
wards political offenders and political crimes. 20 Many Euro-
pean democracies were the product of revolution and thus,
strongly opposed the extradition of political offenders and
refugees. 21
The Belgium Extradition Act of 183322 marked the statu-
tory beginning of the political offense doctrine.23 The exception
was worded very broadly. 24 Belgium put this clause in all its
subsequent extradition treaties, the first in 1833,25 and other
countries have since followed this example. 26
This exception was further developed in the twentieth cen-
tury. The individual became the primary focus and concern of
the inquiry.27 Nations began applying the exception not only to
persons who committed active crimes, but also to those persons
who committed passive crimes. 28 Western nations previously
applied the exception to only those persons who acted in favor of
democracy, in order to protect those who fought for liberal de-
mocracy. 29 These nations, however, now began to apply the doc-
trine even to those who acted in opposition to democratic
ideals. 30 The inception of human rights laws also prompted the
trend of preference toward asylum and the broadening of the
20 See id. at 9.
21 See id. at 11.
22 Belgium Extradition Act, October 1, 1833.
23 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 12.
24 The translation of Article 6 of the Belgium Extradition Act provides that "it
shall be expressly stipulated in these treaties that the foreigner shall not be prose-
cuted nor punished for any political offence [committed] before extradition, nor for
any fact connected to such crime.. . ." Id. at 13.
25 The Franco-Belgium treaty, 22 B.F.S.P. 223 (1833).
26 This clause has been referred to as the 'Belgium clause,' or now as the 'at-
tentat clause.' See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 16. Today, this clause
excludes attacks on the Head of State from the exception. See GEOFF GILBERT,
ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 116 (1991).
27 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 17-18.
28 See id. An active crime is one where the individual acts in an overt, affirm-
ative manner that directly causes the result. A passive crime is when the result is
caused by a failure of an individual to act when a duty to act was present.
29 See GILBERT, supra note 26, at 115. The political offense doctrine is not
recognized nor practiced among socialist states. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra
note 2, at 1 n.3.
30 See id. at 19-20.
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exception. 31 Thus, we see the background of our modern notion
of the political offense exception.
B. The Political Offense Dilemma
As previously stated, there are two sides to the political of-
fense exception. The reasons for opposition, and again the ex-
ception, are strong. While in some cases there is a real and
apparent need for asylum (whether for national political rea-
sons or humanitarian reasons), in others, the criminal gets to
use, and will take advantage of, the exception.
Turning to the first proposition, several rationales behind
the political offense doctrine become evident in situations and
cases that arise between state actors alone - without the inter-
ference of an international body. In some instances, it would be
morally and politically necessary to grant the accused individ-
ual asylum.32 Here, the first rationale of moral and political ne-
cessity is self-evident in that there exists two positive rights:
the right of a state to grant asylum as well as a right of asylum
for the individual. 33 The right of the state comes from "the nor-
mal exercise of the territorial sovereignty."34 Many nations
have included this right in their own constitutions. 35 The right
to asylum for the individual may stem from municipal law.36 In
extradition law, the right to grant asylum, however, may "only
be exercised with respect to persons not covered by the terms of
31 See id. at 18-20.
32 Asylum is "protection against another State, acting through its lawful, duly
accredited, and duly authorized organs, or, in some cases, through agencies operat-
ing openly or covertly on behalf of the government, the ruling party, or the ruling
clique." ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL AsYLUM 1 (Almqvist & Wiksell Inter-
national 1980). "Asylum accorded by a State to persons in its territory is generally
referred to as 'territorial asylum.'" Id.
33 See id. at 2.
34 Id. (quoting Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. 266 at 274 (Columbia/Peru)).
35 See HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM 64-71
(Hague Academy of International Law 1989). A sample of excerpts includes:
Egypt: "the right to political asylum shall be guaranteed by the State to every
foreigner persecuted for defending the people's interests, human rights, peace, or
justice." Egypt CONST. art, 53 (1) (1980). "The extradition of political refugees
shall be prohibited. Id.; Portugal: "Portuguese citizens shall not be extradited or
deported from the national territory." Por. CONST. art. 33 (1) (1982). "No one shall
be extradited for political reasons." Id., art. 33 (2). "The status of political refu-
gees shall be established by law." Id., art. 33 (7).
36 See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 32, at 2.
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the treaty or specifically exempted from extradition."37 This is
precisely where the political offense doctrine falls.
Another rationale for the political offense doctrine is the
concept of dual criminality.38 This relates back to one of the
fundamental principals of extradition law: if the crime for
which the individual is to be tried is not a crime in a given state,
the individual should not be sent to a state where he or she will
be tried for the crime.39 The United States in particular has
applied this rationale to many cases dealing with the First
Amendment. 40
A third reason for the application of the doctrine is that
there is no guarantee that the accused will receive a fair trial
when sent back to the government of which he is a known oppo-
nent.41 This illustrates the humanitarian argument in support
of the doctrine. By extraditing the accused, the state could un-
intentionally be sending him to face a biased trial and to un-
dergo severe and cruel punishment.42 France recently adopted
this humanitarian argument when it refused to extradite
Mikhail Bondarj to Russia, where he was accused of breaking
into apartments in Russia and subsequently forcing his victims
to swallow strong drugs in order to weaken their resistance and
avoid a struggle.43 France refuses to extradite persons to coun-
tries in which the accused would be subject to the threat of capi-
tal punishment. Thus, France is using this exact humanitarian
rationale to refuse extradition to Russia.44
Fourth, the political interest, or allegiance, of a state may
dictate whether to extradite. 45 Espionage is a crime that falls
37 Id. at 18.
38 See Mary V. Mochary et al., Extradition and the Political Offense Exception,
81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 467, 472 (1987).
39 See id. Cf. United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419 (1997) (holding that even
though the defendant faced a "real, substantial, reasonable, and appreciable fear
of foreign conviction," id. at 1426, he could not invoke the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination). See id.
40 See Mochary, supra note 38, at 472. The First Amendment of the United
States' Constitution guarantees the right of free speech. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41 See Mochary, supra note 38, at 472.
42 See id.; see also Sarah L. Nagy, Comment, Political Offense Exceptions to
United States Extradition Policy: Aut Dedere Aut Judicare (Either Extradite or
Prosecute), 1 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 109 (1991).
43 See ITAR-TASS News Agency, Russian Federation, Thurs. July 2, 1998.
44 See id.
45 See Mochary, supra note 38, at 472.
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within this category. 46 A nation would not want to punish an
individual who has spied on its behalf. Simultaneously, how-
ever, that nation would not want to promote the breach of a na-
tion's security. 47 The decision not to extradite in this case
would be made for the state via reliance on the political offense
doctrine, and therefore, in essence, would not require the state
to take a position on the specific question of extradition for
espionage.
A final rationale has its foundations in the concept of neu-
trality.48 Whether to extradite or not could imply taking sides
in a situation. An inquiry into the question of extradition may
require passing judgment on the political acts within another
country.4 9 As a general rule, states seek to avoid this by relying
on the political offense exception.50
On the other side of the coin, there are reasons opposing
the political offense exception. The first reason offered is the
theory of national sovereignty. 51 If a person commits a crime
within a particular nation, that nation should presumably have
the right to try him. There is no justification for other nations
to step in and impose their values and/or judicial systems upon
a criminal fugitive or the nation from where he came. It is, of
course, the refugee nation that determines whether or not the
crime is of political character. This allows the refugee state to
impose its subjective view on the requesting state. By harbor-
ing the criminal and not allowing the controlling nation to bring
him back and try him, the sheltering nation may be infringing
upon the national sovereignty of the requesting state and as a
result its right to subject the accused to its own laws and crimi-
nal proceedings.
A second argument on this point is that the political offense
exception supports or encourages criminal activity as long as it
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 3.
49 See id.
50 This application of the concept of neutrality is similar to a rule followed in
the United States' judicial system called the Act of State Doctrine. See Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). This doctrine, stated generally and without the
mention of specific exceptions, prohibits United States' national courts to pass
judgment on the legality of acts of another government within its own territory.
See id.
51 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 204.
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has a political tie.52 Offering refuge to those who commit crimes
in times of political upheaval hardly advocates peaceful trans-
formation of governments. It would be the equivalent of affirm-
atively allowing and supporting persons to commit crimes in
order to further their own political interests. Any modem day
criminal could easily take advantage of such an exception. The
above section represents the rationales in support of and in op-
position to the political offense doctrine. Also important are
problems that are considered inherent in the doctrine.
C. Inherent Problems with the Political Offense Doctrine
One problem with the political offense exception in the con-
text of the international community is that the term "political
offense" or "political character" is not precisely defined in any
one country. Similarly, the "political offender" is also not de-
fined with any great certainty. Generally, "[t]he pseudo-polit-
ical offender is a person who has committed a political crime but
who lacks the necessary ideological motivation."5 3
A political offense can be classified as a pure political of-
fense or a relative political offense.5 4 An act "directed solely
against the political order"55 is a pure political offense. 56 Rela-
tive political offenses can be broken into two sub-categories. 57
Ddlit complexe are those acts "directed at both the political or-
der and private rights."58 D6lit connexe is "in itself not an act
directed against the political order, but which is closely con-
nected with another act which is so directed."59
52 See id. at 202.
53 Id. at 27. To explain, one who is motivated by personal reasons would not
be considered a political offender. Id. The separation of the two motivations, per-
sonal and political, is important because "the preferred treatment, created for
political offenders, in fact was meant for the person of the political offender,
whereas the criteria for the granting of this treatment were in practice almost
always based on the act." Id.
54 See GILBERT, supra note 26, at 118.
55 Id. (quoting IvAN SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 185
(Manchester University Press 1971)).
56 Acts of treason or espionage would be included in this category. See GEOFF
GILBERT, supra note 26, at 118.
57 See id. at 118.
58 Id. at 181. An example would be when the act is that of a common criminal,
such as murder, but the goals and motives of the act are political. See id. at 119.
59 SHEARER, supra note 55 at 181-2. These acts are remote from any political
goal and are thus difficult to recognize and accept. An illustration would be "the
[Vol. 11:419
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In addition to the lack of a clear and objective definition of
the exception among nations, the application of the exception
varies widely from nation to nation. The application of the doc-
trine in Great Britain was first established in the case of In re
Castioni.60 In that case, the accused could not be surrendered
to Switzerland because "the offence which the prisoner had com-
mitted was incidental to and formed a part of political distur-
bances, and therefore was an offence of a political character
. ... "61 This requirement of proximity to the political objective
of the accused has captured worldwide acceptance. 62 Thus, this
test focuses more on the actual act of the individual rather than
on his political motivations. 63
In contrast, the approach to the political offense doctrine in
the United States is not based on a generally accepted rule of
law. It is applied and tested on a case by case, treaty by treaty
theft of guns in order to prepare for an armed rebellion and robbing a bank in
order to provide funds for subversive political activities." GILBERT, supra note 26,
at 199 (citing Ferrandi v. Governor of Brixton Prison, DC/205/81, (MWC), QBD, 22
June '81; Re Kexel and Tillman's application for habeas corpus, (CO/962/83, CO/
963/83) LEXIS, 10 Apr. 1984, QBD).
60 In re Castioni, 1 Eng. Rep. 149 (Q.B. 1890).
61 Id. at 149. Article 3(1) of the Extradition Act of 1870 of Great Britain
stated that
a fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offence in respect of
which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or... that
the requisition for his surrender has in fact been made with a view to try
or punish him for an offence of a political character.
Extradition Act of 1870, art. 3(1).
62 See GILBERT, supra note 26, at 122. For example, the Dutch and Australian
courts have followed this test. See, e.g., Folkerts v. Public Prosecutor, 74 I.L.R. 489
(1978) (Netherlands) ("Offences which were not in themselves of a political nature
should nevertheless be regarded as political offences or as offences connected with
such offences if, in the light of the circumstances in which they had been commit-
ted, they were of a predominantly political character." Id. at 499.). In Prevato v.
Governor Metropolitan Remand Centre, 64 A.L.R. 37 (1986) (Australia), the Court
explained that
[not every offence committed in the course of opposition to government
policy is a political offence. There must be, at least, an organized, pro-
longed campaign involving a number of people. The offence must be di-
rected solely to that purpose; it must not involve the satisfaction of private
ends. And the offence must be committed in the direct prosecution of that
campaign; so an assault upon a political opponent in the course of the
campaign may be a political offence but an assault upon a bank teller in
the course of a robbery carried out to obtain funds for use in the campaign
would not be.
Id.
63 See GILBERT, supra note 26, at 122.
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basis.64 The first case in which the United States interpreted
the political offense doctrine was In re Ezeta.65 There, the court
held that a crime is one of political character if it was commit-
ted "in the course of' or "in furtherance of' disturbing the polit-
ical system.66 Hence, the test was twofold. First, the accused
must show the existence of a political disturbance. If that is
satisfied, the accused must then show that the acts were at-
tempts to affect the political system. 67 In recent years, how-
ever, courts have been more flexible and have focused on factors
other than the pure existence of a political disturbance. 68
The French approach to the political offence doctrine is per-
haps more stringent than that of the United States. Founded in
the landmark case of Re Giovanni Gatti,69 France has followed
the rule that the exception extends solely to those individuals
whose acts affected only the state, and in no way affected indi-
viduals.70 Thus, France takes a staunch pure political offense
approach 7l to the doctrine.
64 See id. at 124. Actually, in the United States, there has been "no instance
where an extradition has occurred without a treaty." A.B.A. J. 28 (Apr. 1998)
(quoting Magistrate Marcel C. Notzon). "[No branch of government has authority
to surrender an accused to a foreign country except in pursuance of a statute or
treaty." In Re Extradition of Howard (United States v. Howard), 996 F.2d 1320,
1329 (1st Cir. 1993). "In the absence of a treaty there is no duty to extradite."
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 at 782 (9' Cir. 1986) (quoting Factor v. Lauben-
heimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933)).
65 In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
66 See id. at 998. "Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil
war, insurrection or political commotion." Id. (quoting John Stuart Mill, Han-
sard's Debates, vol. 184, p. 2115).
67 See id.; see also GILBERT, supra note 26, at 125. The test used by the United
States has been characterized as one of the strictest, since the determinative factor
is the proof of political disturbance. See id. In Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d
Cir. 1980), the accused alleged that Italy's request for extradition for financial
crimes was merely a pretext to try him for a political scandal. See id at 173-175.
The court held, however, that since there was no proof of the existence of a political
disturbance, the offence was not deemed political and thus ordered his extradition.
See id.
6s See Mahmoud El-Abed Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 ( 2 nd Cir. 1990).
There, the court used such factors as the status of the accused (civilian or mili-
tary), the nature of the crime (an atrocity, one in violation of international law,
war crime), any allegiance the accused may have to an organization, and the place
where the act was committed. See generally id. See also GILBERT, supra note 26,
at 126.
69 145 Ann.Dig. 145 (1947). See generally GILBERT, supra note 26.
70 See id.
71 See supra Part II.C, para. 2.
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It is evident from only these three examples that there is
much debate and confusion in the application of the political of-
fense doctrine by international actors. This only becomes more
complicated with the application of more than eighty individual
national policies, as is the case with the ICC. Coupled with
modern technology and communication, and the evolving ideals
and norms of states, the need to reform the political offense doc-
trine is obvious. 72
D. The Political Offense Exception in Modern Times
The political offense doctrine is seen as both a principle of
international law and as a mere state practice. For example, at
one point, Irish courts refused to extradite individuals involved
in the violence in Northern Ireland in the 1970's based on the
holding the violence was politically motivated.7 3 Moreover, the
Irish Constitution obligates the courts to recognize general
principles of accepted international law.74 Because the courts
found that denying the extradition of politically motivated
criminals was one of these generally recognized principles, the
courts have staunchly upheld their decisions. 75 On the other
hand, a Sudanese court held in Steiner76 that although the ex-
72 While there is a general consensus of a need to reform the doctrine, there
exist many different views on how to proceed. Some advocate a restriction on the
discretion given to court in determining political offenses, see, Pamela Loughman,
Carron v. McMahon: The Widening Scope of the Political Offense Exception to Ex-
tradition, Comment, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 635 (1992), which for some includes the
need to shift the decision on the executive or legislative branches; see Mochary,
supra note 38, at 475 (Remarks by Torsten Stein). Some press the need to restrict
the actual doctrine itself. GILBERT, supra note 26. Further, some support abolition
of the entire doctrine. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 205.
73 See GILBERT, supra note 26, at 117.
74 See IR. CONST. art. 29(3). "Ireland accepts the generally recognised princi-
ples of international law as its rule of conduct in its relations with other states."
See id.
75 It must be noted however, that in more recent decisions, the Republic of
Ireland has extradited terrorists to Northern Ireland. The courts held that "[t]he
excusing per se of murder, and of offenses involving violence and the infliction of
human suffering, done by, or at the behest of self-ordained arbiters, is the very
antithesis of the ordinances of Christianity and civilization and of the basic re-
quirements of political activity." Mochary, supra note 38, at 469 (quoting
McGlinchy). Another case similarly held that the murders "were so brutal, cow-
ardly and callous that it would be a distortion of language if they were to be ac-
corded the status of political offenses or offenses connected with political offenses."
Id. (quoting Shannon).
76 In the Trial of F.E. Steiner, 74 I.L.R. 478 (1971) (Sudan).
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ception is the "practice of the comity of nations,"77 it is not a
strict rule of international law that criminals who fall within
the category of political offenders should never be extradited.78
Thus, there is no uniform way of interpreting or applying the
doctrine. 79
The world is constantly getting smaller with the aid of tech-
nology. People across the world can communicate by phone,
videophone, facsimile or even by computer. As a result of all
this new technology, new crimes have emerged. 0 Information
can be passed, dispersed and discussed across thousands of
miles in a matter of seconds. Furthermore, travel is increas-
ingly easy and inexpensive. Trains, planes and boats now af-
ford people the possibility of getting from one hemisphere to the
other in a matter of hours. The great modernization of technol-
ogy, however, also makes it extremely easy for criminals to flee
and find refuge.
As previously mentioned, technology has caused the emer-
gence of new crimes. Terrorism"' has become a household word
in many nations. New deadly bombs and airplane hijackings
are two ways in which technology has added to the criminal
world.8 2 These crimes can either be politically motivated or
77 Id. at 480.
78 See generally Steiner, 74 I.L.R. 478.
79 See id. at 478, noting that there is no uniform definition of political offense.
80 This author feels that with the birth of the widespread use of airplanes for
travel, hijacking became common in the 1980s. More recently, along with the in-
ception of the Internet, computer crimes now frequent the international
community.
81 Currently, the application of the political offence doctrine is very difficult
and complicated to ascertain with regards to terrorism, since most acts of terror-
ism can be politically motivated, yet nations hardly want to grant asylum to ter-
rorists. See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 23-25. It should be noted that
the definition of the word "terrorism," like definitions of "political offense" is very
vague. In the United States "terrorism" is defined as
an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life
that is a violation of the criminals laws of the United States or of any
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the juris-
diction of the United States or of any State; and appears to be intended -
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of
a government by assassination or kidnapping.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3077 (1985). See also BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at
1473.
82 See VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 2, at 22-23.
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simply claimed to be of such nature. In fact, prior to 1974, sev-
enty percent of airplane hijackings ended with political asylum
being granted to the criminal.8 3 It appears that where a terror-
ist can claim a political connection to his crime, he may then
flee to a state that will grant him asylum.8 4 In modern times,
criminals may know the exception exists and that they have
easy access to nations that grant asylum for such acts. Grant-
ing asylum in such situations seems to advocate the policy of
refusing to punish a known criminal simply because he crossed
international boundaries.
Another aspect of modem life is the growing awareness of
human rights law and humanitarian law.8 5 Currently, the
United Nations is examining the need to set minimum humani-
tarian standards and arrange for greater protection of human
rights, specifically in situations of internal conflict.8 6 This no-
tion no longer remains internal, for with international tribunals
now being established to deal with grave crimes against hu-
manity,8 7 human rights standards and protections now attract
international recognition.
Many humanitarian and human rights groups support the
creation of the ICC.s8 In fact, human rights were a major force
83 See id. at 23 n.124 (citing N. JOYNER, Aerial Hijacking as an International
Crime 186-96 (1974)).
84 See id. at 23. In September 1997, Great Britain's statutory instrument
1997 No. 1763 entitled The Extradition (Hijacking) Order 1997 came into force.
This is to be complementary to existing treaties and does not mention the political
offence exception.
85 Human rights law and humanitarian law have both similarities and
differences:
Human rights advocates fear that the realism built into humanitarian
law (for example, through such notions as military necessity) will compro-
mise the idealism of human rights law. On the other hand, those used to
basing their advocacy on international humanitarian law fear that the
politicization associated with human rights work will compromise the
neutral and purely humanitarian nature of their work.
David Petrasek, Moving Forward on the Development of Minimum Humanitarian
Standards, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 at 560 (1998). See The Extradition (Hijacking)
Order, S.I. 1997, No. 1763.
86 See generally David Petrasek, supra note 85.
87 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the recent adoption of
the International Criminal Court.
88 Such as Amnesty International, the International Center for Human
Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) and the United Nations Interna-
tional Children Education Fund (UNICEF). See The Coalition for the Interna-
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behind the development of the ICC.89 The ICC's supporters
hope to ensure fair trials and just punishment.90 Human rights
law and humanitarian law recently have shifted focus from the
rights and duties of states to the rights and duties of individu-
als.91 Thus, these laws were inherently incorporated into the
ICC.92 Such focus on individual human rights tends to
strengthen the argument in support of the political offense doc-
trine. This leads us to perhaps the most recent addition to mod-
ern international law - the new permanent ICC.
PART III:
The Central Issue - The Birth of The International
Criminal Court
The international community as a whole has finally decided
that crimes of an international character such as terrorism, ge-
nocide, and war crimes must be prosecuted. The idea of an in-
ternational criminal court has been idling since the 1919 Paris
Treaty after World War 1.93 Thoughts of Nuremberg, 94 the ad
hoc judicial tribunal that prosecuted Nazis for their war crimes,
helped prompt the feeling of necessity of an international tribu-
nal. More recent developments such as the creation of the in-
tional Criminal Court (June 15 - July 17) (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.igc.
orglicc/rome/index.html>.
89 The American Bar Association has "advocated the creation of the court
since 1978 as a way to punish individuals responsible for gross violations of inter-
national law, particularly war crimes and related crimes against humanity, and
violations of international human rights." Rhonda McMillion, On Behalf of the
World: ABA Urges Congressional Action on Key International Law Issues, A.B.A.
J. 99 (Mar. 1997).
90 See The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, supra note 88.
91 See generally Bartram S. Brown, Comment, Nationality and International-
ity in International Humanitarian Law, 34 STAN J. INT'L L. 347 (1998).
92 David Scheffer, Head of the United States Delegation to negotiate the crea-
tion of the ICC stated that "[olne could almost say that in this office it's not a
human rights watch per se, it's an atrocities watch." Steven Keeva, Global Justice
Edges Closer: Creation of International Criminal Court Under Negotiation, A.B.A.
J. 22 (Nov. 1997).
93 See id.
94 The Nuremberg Trial was the International Military Tribunal created for
the prosecution of war criminals. See GEORGE GINSBURGS AND V.N. KUDRIAVTSEV,
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 4-8 (Kiuwer Academic Publish-
ers, ed. 1990). On August 8, 1945, the major powers, France, Great Britain,
U.S.S.R. and the United States, signed the agreement to institute the tribunal to
try Hitler's government, the cause of the inhumane suffering. See id.
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ternational criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia have brought the idea closer to a reality.95 The Nu-
remberg tribunal bears several important facets to the current
issue. First, it brought together the judicial ideals, laws and
politics of varying countries into one body of law.96 This is ex-
actly what is intended to happen with the ICC. A consensus
must be reached, not just between four countries, but between
more than eighty countries and their individualized and unique
political, social and legal ideals and norms. 97
Second, the political offense doctrine was nowhere to be
seen in the Nuremberg tribunal. Since the Nazis were working
under the control of Hitler's governmental regime, the claim of
political character could have been made. It often seems virtu-
ally impossible to separate the idea of war crimes from politics,
since war is, in its essence, political. Additionally, it is difficult
to fathom the idea of "international" without implied reference
to politics. At the time of the Nuremberg tribunal, the countries
involved had well-established rules of law incorporating the
political offense doctrine. 98 So perhaps there is no place in an
international tribunal for the political offense doctrine. 99 The
Nuremberg tribunal set precedent in its all-encompassing view
of humanity, and in the consolidation and cooperation of vastly
different nations working toward a common goal: peace. 100
Many years after Nuremberg, nations have continued to
entertain the idea of a permanent international tribunal. 10 1
95 See Keeva, supra note 92, at 22.
96 While France was a nation based on continental law, Great Britain and the
United States were based on Anglo-Saxon law. See GINSBURGs and KUDRIAVTSEV,
supra note 94, at 5. In the United States and Great Britain, the presiding judge is
somewhat passive. See id. The Soviet system advocated an active role of the
judge; another example of a substantial difference in the judicial systems is the
role of the defendant; in the United States, the defendant can be a witness, how-
ever, in the U.S.S.R., this is not allowed; these were but a few of the difficulties the
participating nations had to overcome. There were, of course, many other differ-
ences ranging from rules of evidence, to burden of proof, to procedural rules. See
GINSBURGS AND KUDRIAVTSEV, supra note 94, at 5.
97 See infra note 103 for a list of countries that have thus far ratified the Rome
Statute.
98 See supra notes 3-5.
99 See infra, Part IV.
100 See generally GINSBURS AND KUDRIAVTSEV, supra note 94.
101 A representative of Canada has stated
[tihe establishment of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda provide proof, if that were needed, that the international
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From June 15, 1998, until July 17, 1998, at the headquarters of
the Food and Agriculture Organization, more than 130 coun-
tries took part in the drafting of the ICC.102 These meetings
culminated when the draft of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (Rome Statute) was finished and signed
by 29 countries 10 3 on July 17-18, 1998.104 According to article
126 of the Rome Statute, the Statute will enter into force "on
the first day of the month after the 6 0 th day following the date of
the deposit of the 6 0 th instrument of ratification, acceptance, ap-
proval or accession .... ,,105 As of July 1999, four countries had
ratified the statute: Italy, San Marino, Senegal, and Trinidad
and Tobago. 106
The overall purpose of the ICC is to promote world peace
and, through a permanent body, apply a consistent approach to
community can accept and has accepted the idea of the need for a func-
tioning international criminal court. It is now up to governments to act.
It is unfortunate that this initiative was propelled by the horrific events in
those war-torn countries, but because those events call out for a principled
response on the part of the world community, this opportunity must be
seized before the United Nations fall back into the complacency that fol-
lowed the conclusion of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Robert R. Fowler, Statement by H.E. Robert R. Fowler Ambassador and Permanent
Representative of Canada to the United Nations to the Sixth Committee of the 51st
General Assembly Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (Oct. 29, 1996) (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://wag-
ingpeace.org/>.
102 See The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, supra note 88.
103 The 29 countries that signed the treaty on these dates in Rome were: Alba-
nia, Andorra, Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, France, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Italy,
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritus, Monaco, Namibia, The
Netherlands, Niger, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See The Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, supra note 88. Since then, fifty-five countries have signed: An-
gola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, C6te D'Ivoire, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Finland, Gabon,
Gambia, Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solo-
mon Islands, Sweden, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom and Venezuela. See id. This
makes for a total of 84 countries currently signed onto and accepting the Rome
Statue.
104 See id.
105 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art.126(1).
106 See id. The Statute will remain at the United Nations in New York, USA
for signature until December 31, 2000. See id.
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international crimes that deserve prosecution.10 7 The ICC is
meant to be a completely apolitical, neutral judicial body and
will have "international legal personality."10 8 It will sit at The
Hague in the Netherlands, and may sit elsewhere if needed. 10 9
When a state becomes a party to the treaty it accepts jurisdic-
tion of the Court.110 It is a court to which countries can turn
when their own national courts either are unable or unwilling
to hear a case, and thus is to be a complementary system to
national criminal courts.11 These goals are reflected in the re-
curring theme of cooperation, for throughout the statute, the
ICC repeatedly calls upon the cooperation of states. 11 2
Thus, after years of idealistic chatter, the ICC was finally
born. "Make no mistake about it, this is international lawmak-
107 See generally The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (Aug. 8, 1988) (visited
Oct. 15, 1999) <http://wagingpeace.org>.
10 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 4.
109 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 3.
110 See id. art. 12. One of the provisions to the Rome Statute proposed by the
United States was that of a jurisdictional "opt-in/opt-out" clause in which individ-
ual states could decide which crimes the Court could prosecute. See The Interna-
tional Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Towards an
Effective International Criminal Court (visited Sept. 25, 1998) <gopher://go-
pher.igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/iccdngodocs/rome/ichrdd.txt>. Another U.S. proposal
was an approvals process that would allow prosecution or investigation of a crime
only if the victim's State, the suspect's State, the State with custody of the person,
the State in which the crime occurred and the State requesting the surrender con-
sented. See id. These, however, were ultimately rejected by a majority of the
states. See id. The United States has not, as of yet, signed the Rome Statute.
111 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art.1. Many nations support and accept
the idea of a complimentary system. "Brazil also supports the view of the Interna-
tional Law Commission that the court should be seen as complementary to na-
tional criminal justice systems, in cases where trial procedures are unavailable or
deemed to be ineffective." Statement of Brazil to the United Nations to the Sixth
Committee of the 51" General Assembly Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (last modified Aug. 3, 1998) (vis-
ited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://wagingpeace.org>. A representative from Austria stated
that "[w]e likewise stressed the concept of inherent jurisdiction based solely on the
ratification of the Statute and supported the principle of complementarily." Pro-
fessor Dr. Gerhard Hafner, Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations:
Establishment of an International Criminal Court Statement by Professor Dr. Ger-
hard Hafner (Oct. 28, 1996) (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http://wagingpeace.org>. See
also infra note 119 regarding national sovereignty.
112 Article 86 is entitled "General Obligation to Cooperate;" Article 87 is enti-
tled "Requests for Cooperation: general provisions." See Rome Statute, supra note
9, arts. 86, 87. The obligation to cooperate can be seen throughout the other provi-
sions such as with the absconding of persons against whom the prosecutor has a
warrant. See id. art. 19(8)(c).
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ing of historic proportions. Not since the establishment of the
UN itself have so many countries voluntarily yielded ground on
such a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty."1 13
The jurisdiction of the ICC is "limited to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole." 11 4 The Court will have jurisdiction with respect to
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes of aggression. 1 5 Regarding jurisdiction, there are only a
few reasons a case may be deemed inadmissible:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; (b) The
case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over
it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person con-
cerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or in-
ability of the State genuinely to prosecute; (c) The person
concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject
of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under
article 20, paragraph 3; (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to
justify further action by the Court.116
The accused, the state that has jurisdiction of the case, or the
state from which consent to jurisdiction is required can bring
challenges to the admissibility of a case." 7
113 William R. Pace, The Day Peace Won, (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <gopher://go-
pher.igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icdngodocs/monitor/nine/pace.txt> (quoting TIMES OF
INDIA, editorial, August 1, 1998).
114 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 5.1.
115 See id. Rome Statute, in great detail, defines each of these crimes. Geno-
cide is defined as "any of the following acts [e.g., killing or causing great bodily or
mental harm to members of the group] committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group...." Id. at art. 6. Crimes
against humanity means "any of the following acts [e.g., murder, torture, deporta-
tion, rape] when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack .... " Id. at art. 7.
War crimes includes "[girave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, namely, any of the following acts [willful killing, torture, extensive destruc-
tion and appropriation of property, taking of hostages] against persons or property
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention . . . ." Id. at art.
8. This also includes other violations such as directing attacks against religious or
historic buildings and destroying or seizing property. Rome Statute, supra note 9,
art. 8.
116 Id. art. 17.
117 See id. art. 19.
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In choosing the applicable law, the ICC will consider the
Rome Statute and its procedural rules, applicable treaties, es-
tablished principles of international law, and also the national
laws of the States that would normally exercise jurisdiction. 118
Thus, the ICC will factor in as many viewpoints as possible so
as to retain its neutrality and fairness, and the practice would
not result in an infringement upon the national sovereignty of
the parties involved. 11 9
PART IV:
Critical Analysis - The Political Offense Exception within
the Context of the ICC
Before exploring the political offense exception, one recent
case should be placed in the context of the ICC. First, the
Court, by statute, has eradicated the claim of diplomatic immu-
nity. Article 27, entitled "Irrelevance of official capacity," pro-
vides that:
This statute shall apply equally to all persons without any dis-
tinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or
118 See id. art. 21(1). In applying the national laws of the States, those laws
cannot be inconsistent with those the ICC, international law, or international prin-
ciples. See id.
119 Speakers from many countries have addressed and dismissed the fear that
the ICC will impinge upon the national sovereignty of nations. A representative
from Italy stated that
[t]he fundamental role of law in the creation of the new world order must
be upheld. National sovereignty has nothing to fear from the consolidation
of international law. We believe that the cause of peace can only profit
from the establishment of an International Criminal Court on violations
of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. Italy is
committed to this goal and is ready to host in 1998 a diplomatic confer-
ence to sanction the birth of such a Court.
Ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, Statement by the Permanent Representative of
Italy, Abassador Francesco Paolo Fulci to the Preparatory Committee on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court (Feb. 11, 1997) (visited Oct. 15, 1999)
<http://wagingpeace.org>. Further, China commended the complimentary princi-
ple when a representative stated that "[tihe International Criminal Court should
not supplant national courts or become a supranational court or act as an appeal
court to the national courts ... We are pleased that the complementarily principle
has been incorporated in the preamble.... " Ambassador Chen Shiqiu, Statement
by H.E. Ambassador Chen Shiqiu Representative to China to the Sixth Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Oct. 30, 1996) (visited
Oct. 15, 1999) <http://wagingpeace.org>.
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parliament . . . shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, con-
stitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or interna-
tional law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction
over such a person.120
Recently, the Spanish Government asked the English Gov-
ernment to extradite the former Chilean dictator, General Au-
gusto Pinochet. 12 1 The charges against the former dictator
involved torture and killings by the Argentine and Chilean mili-
tary rulers, and specifically, the killing or disappearance of 94
people of various nationalities in the 1970's and 1980's.122 How-
ever, Chilean officials contended that General Pinochet had dip-
lomatic immunity as a "Senator for Life."123
It is clear from the language in the Rome Statute that the
ICC would not have tolerance for such a claim.1 24 Although
there are no specific articles in the statute that discuss the
political offense doctrine, certainly the ICC's strong opposition
to the claim of diplomatic immunity will carry over to any
claims that the individual be exempt from prosecution based
upon the political character of the crime. All crimes will be
treated equally, regardless of the political motivation of the ac-
cused. Previously, it has been suggested that an international
criminal court may be a possible solution to the political offense
dilemma.125
The jurisdiction and purpose of the Court implicitly pre-
cludes the political offense doctrine from operating. The crimes
over which it has jurisdiction could often be classified as polit-
ical in nature or character. War crimes, crimes against human-
ity, genocide and crimes of aggression could be incorporated
into the doctrine. If the doctrine were to have a place in the
120 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 27. In addition, military commanders and
other superiors are also not exempt from criminal liability. See id. art. 28.
121 See Marlese Simons, Spain Says It's Neutral on Pinochet; Signs Are Other-
wise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, § A, at 14. Due to the complexity of this particular
subject, this Comment will not discuss this issue in detail.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 27.
125 See GILBERT, supra note 26, at 156.
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ICC, the doctrine would not only undermine a fundamental pur-
pose of the Court, but could actually eradicate the jurisdiction of
the ICC. In addition, a politically neutral body certainly cannot
peer into the inner-workings of a country and pass judgment on
its politics, and therefore cannot entertain the political offense
doctrine.
This idea was endorsed by Austria, which conveyed the
thought that there was no place in the ICC for the exception. In
a statement given to the chairman of the committee prior to the
Rome conference, a representative from Austria stated:
In the view of my delegation, this particular grounds [sic] for de-
nial [political nature of a crime] are inadequate for the purposes
of the ICC. Already a quick look at the crimes falling under the
jurisdiction of the ICC and the circumstances under which these
crimes are likely to be committed reveals the inadequacy of the [ ]
political nature since almost all these crimes could in the view of
the one or the other qualify as being politically motivated ...
Under [these] heterogeneous circumstances it will be difficult to
define the political nature of an act - unless all acts being rele-
vant to the international system will be qualified as political ones
S.. [T]his ground is always policy oriented and depends on the
definition by the individual State. But to leave the definition of
the political nature [] to the individual states will substantially
impair the efficiency of the ICC and make the duty to cooperate a
mere recommendation. This outcome is unacceptable to my
delegation. 126
There have, of course, been questions about the ICC's abil-
ity to achieve true neutrality. The ICC might be too remote to
be impartial in the judgment of terrorist crimes, yet not so re-
mote as to not be politically affected. 127 For example, "[hiow
could it decide the fate of a member of the PLO (Palestine Liber-
ation Organization) if both Israel and Libya, for example, had
representatives on the bench?"1 28 The following discussion will
allay these fears by emphasizing that the ICC will be a truly
impartial international tribunal.
126 Hafner, supra note 111. It must be noted, however, that following this pas-
sage the representative stated that he would like a "restriction of the exception to
the duty to cooperate to the utmost minimum in the interest of the efficiency of the
ICC." Id.
127 See GILBERT, supra note 26, at 156.
128 Id.
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Before discussing the policy reasons and rationales behind
the political offense doctrine within the context of the ICC, it is
important to note that the Rome Statute does not explicitly ex-
terminate the doctrine. The few specific provisions regarding
extradition are found deep in the body of the statute. 129 The
Court is authorized to request the arrest and surrender of an
individual to any state.130 That state is then obliged, with re-
spect to its national laws, to comply with the request. 131 Where
there are competing requests for an individual with respect to
the same conduct, and the state competing with the Court is a
party to the statute, the Court shall be given priority.' 32 If the
competing state is not a party to the statute, the refugee state
shall, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite
the individual to the competing state, give priority to the
Court.' 33 If the refugee state is under an international obliga-
tion to extradite the individual, it may itself decide whether to
extradite to the competing state or submit the individual to the
Court. 34 Thus, the Court gives the requested state wide lati-
tude and discretion in making its extradition decision. 35
Dealing with these articles in turn, first, in article 89, enti-
tled "Surrender of persons to the Court," the Court allows the
requested state to comply with the request of the Court in ac-
cordance with its national law.' 36 Presumably, under this pro-
vision, if the political offense exception to extradition is
129 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 89-91.
130 See id. art. 89.
131 See id.
132 See id. art. 90(1), (2).
133 See id. art. 90(4).
134 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 90(6). The refugee State should take
the following factors into account when making the decision: "(a) The respective
dates of the requests; (b) The interests of the requesting State including, where
relevant, whether the crime was committed in its territory and the nationality of
the victims and of the person sought; and (c) The possibility of subsequent surren-
der between the Court and the requesting State." Id.
135 These however, articles leave much to each state's interpretation of the
function of the political offense doctrine. One of the unsettled debates in the area
of international law, too complicated to be afforded ample discussion here, is
whether the political offense doctrine is actually international law of civilized na-
tions, or whether it is merely the national law of individual states. See supra Part
I.
136 "States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the
procedure under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surren-
der." Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 89(1).
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embedded in a state's national law, 137 the obligation to extra-
dite or surrender the individual does not exist. This however,
entails an extremely narrow reading of the statute. To read the
article by itself, and incorporate the allowance of the political
offense exception would be contrary to the goals and purposes of
the ICC.
Also, in article 90, entitled "Competing [Riequests," the
Court allows the requested state to take into account interna-
tional obligations 138 in its decision whether to extradite. 39
While the Court may request a state to surrender a person, it is
the individual state that has the authority to decide whether to
extradite. 40 Again, this provision must be read in the context
of the entire Rome Statute and the goals and purposes of the
ICC. First, if the Court is going to abolish the diplomatic immu-
nity exception, an extremely political exception, then it would
be absurd to say that the Court will allow the political offense
doctrine. Second, it is the goal of the ICC to remain neutral and
fair. It would hardly be "fair" to let some individuals escape ju-
risdiction simply because there were sufficient political ties that
fall within the doctrine. Third, the ICC was specifically estab-
lished to handle crimes of a political nature, such as war crimes
and genocide.' 4' Lastly, as shown below, it would be inane to
attach the political offense doctrine where none of the underly-
ing reasons for it are evident.
The political offense doctrine has certain rationales and
purposes that exist when there is an inter-state controversy re-
garding the decision to extradite. 142 These rationales, however,
will cease to exist in the ICC. First, with regard to dual crimi-
137 See supra Part II.D., para.1.
138 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 90.
139 "If the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested
State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the
requesting State, shall give priority to the request for surrender from the Court
... " Id. art. 90(4).
140 One of the proposals to the Statute contained bracketed text for the terms
offered as suggestions for a title to Articles 87 and 88 to be used in conjunction
with Article 90. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 at 133-139. Among the
choices were the words "surrender," "transfer," and "extradition." See id. It can be
inferred that the word "surrender" was ultimately chosen since it lacked the polit-
ical implications contained in the word "extradition." Id.
141 See supra Part IV, para.4.
142 See supra Part II.B.
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nality, the Court only has jurisdiction to hear the most serious
of crimes. 143 Thus, it is more than likely that any crime for
which the ICC could try an individual, will be a crime in the
fugitive state. For example, by signing the Statute, each coun-
try is agreeing that genocide is illegal. There will be no struggle
therefore, between nations regarding the extradition of a person
out of a country where the act is legal, into a country where that
person is subject to criminal liability.
Second, there will no longer be a fear of an unfair trial. The
signatories to the Statute are extremely diverse. Under this
body, the Court will be comprised of judges and prosecutors
from different nations and must always remain neutral. The
Court "could try the fugitive only for the common element of the
crime and punishment would not be based on the political
prejudices inherent in any single state's judiciary."1 44 The
Court will appoint a neutral prosecutor, 145 and the judges will
represent several nations with different ideals. 146 With suffi-
cient publicity and the international community supervising
the trial, there is little chance of unfairness as there would be
under a national court, which could remain out of the interna-
tional public eye.
Furthermore, there will be less justification for fears of
cruel or severe punishment. The rules of procedure and evi-
dence, which supplement the Rome Statute, delineate the pun-
ishment of criminals accordingly, and will be extremely limited
in terms of the punishments that can be ordered. 14 7 There will
be no capital punishment in the ICC. The convicted individual
143 The Court will have the jurisdiction to hear cases regarding the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. See
Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 5(1). See also, supra Part III,
144 GILBERT, supra note 26, at 156.
145 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 42 (The Office of the Prosecutor). Ac-
cordingly, the Prosecutor will be a separate and independent organ of the Court.
See id. art. 42(1). The Deputy Prosecutors will all represent different nationalities.
See id. art. 42(2). The Prosecutor will be elected by secret ballot by an absolute
majority. See id. art. 42(4).
146 See id. art. 36, which requires judges to have experience and competence in
criminal law and procedure, the relevant areas of international law and fluency in
one of the working languages. Further, there shall be equitable geographical rep-
resentation and fair representation of female and male judges. See Rome Statute,
supra note 9, art. 36. Throughout the statute, the theme of impartiality is
stressed.
147 See id., art.108(1), which states:
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will serve his or her sentence in a state designated by the
court. 148 The court, in its sentencing, will take several factors
into account, such as accepted international treaty standards,
the views of the convicted, the nationality of the convicted, the
circumstances of the crime and the necessities of enforce-
ment.149 The convicted individual may also apply for a transfer
during the service of the sentence. 150 The Court clearly and
strictly supervises the enforcement of the sentence with great
emphasis on the need to comply with international treaty stan-
dards regarding the treatment of prisoners. 151 In fact, the ICC,
without the political offense doctrine, will actually promote the
humanitarian concerns of the international community. 15 2
Third, the need to grant asylum for the purpose of retaining
neutrality153 will also disappear. The asylum state would not
be taking sides or passing any judgment upon the political acts
of another nation in relinquishing suspected criminals to the
ICC. In order for the ICC to have jurisdiction over the individ-
ual, the crime must be extremely grave and serious. 54 Also,
the ICC's desire to prosecute a case will imply that there is an
international consensus that the individual should be punished.
Thus, the asylum state would have the backing of the interna-
tional community in choosing to abide by an international norm
rather than unilaterally opposing the requesting nation. Addi-
A sentenced person in the custody of the State of enforcement shall not be
subject to prosecution or punishment or to extradition to a third State for
any conduct engaged in prior to that person's delivery to the State of en-
forcement, unless such prosecution, punishment or extradition has been
approved by the Court at the request of the State of enforcement.
See also id. arts. 103-111. These articles deal with enforcement, limitation on the
prosecution or punishment, reviewability of court for reduction of sentence and
escape.
148 A list of states that are willing to accept sentenced prisoners will be given to
the court. See id. art. 103(1).
149 See id. art. 103(3).
150 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 104(2).
151 See id., art. 106.
152 See supra Part II.D. A report by the Commission on Human Rights to the
United Nations recommended "following closely developments regarding the iden-
tification of crimes against humanity and customary rules of international human-
itarian law. . . ." Petrasek, supra note 85, at 562 (quoting Analytical report of the
Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolu-
tion 1997/21, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87 & Add.1.).
153 See supra Part II.B.
154 See supra Part III.
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tionally, states that are members of the ICC not only have an
obligation to cooperate, 155 they are compelled to cooperate,
which may lead to the surrender of the individual, thus placing
no blame on the asylum state.156 Moreover, by handing the in-
dividual over to the ICC, the asylum state is essentially agree-
ing with the Court only on the fact that the individual deserves
to be investigated. It is the prosecutor who makes the final de-
cision whether to bring the case to trial. The obligation to coop-
erate also dismisses the argument of political interest and
allegiance. 157
As none of the policies in favor of the political offense doc-
trine will work in the ICC, it is important to address the rea-
sons opposing the political offense doctrine. The concerns of
those in opposition to the doctrine will also be unfounded. 158
First, there will be no infringement upon national sover-
eignty.159 This was a concern of many countries.160 Again how-
ever, the ICC is to be complementary to national criminal
courts, and in fact gives great deference to the laws of the indi-
vidual nations involved. Thus, the argument that national sov-
ereignty will be diminished is unfounded. Second, the fear of
the opponents of the doctrine, of encouraging criminal activity
that is tied to political ideals, will be laid aside. By establishing
a permanent international criminal court that will have juris-
diction over crimes that were once viewed as unreachable, it is
hoped that the ICC will work as a deterrent to criminal activ-
ity.161 Because citizens of those nations signing the statute will
be treated equally, whether politically motivated or personally
motivated, there will be no such encouragement.
155 See supra Part III. n.113.
156 If the Court decides the case is inadmissible, the requested State "may, at
its discretion, proceed to deal with the request for extradition from the requesting
State." Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 90(5).
157 See supra Part II.B.
158 See supra Part III.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 David Scheffer, Head of the United States Delegation to negotiate the crea-
tion of the ICC, stated that "[w] e firmly believe in the establishment of such a court
• .. not only to ensure that when crimes of a certain magnitude occur the individu-
als responsible will be brought to justice, but we also support it as a major deter-
rent." Keeva, supra note 92, at 22.
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It can therefore be seen that the ICC reserves no place for
the political offense doctrine. Although rationales exist in sup-
port of the political offense doctrine when individual states are
the primary actors involved, these rationales cease to exist
when the focus forum is a permanent international court. This
can be seen by a common-sense approach of looking to the pur-
poses and goals of the ICC, the articles within the statute, pol-
icy reasons supporting and opposing the doctrine, and
endorsements of individual nations. Without any need for the
doctrine, it will then cease to exist in the ICC.
PART V:
Conclusion
The International Criminal Court is finally within the
world's reach. Not long ago, the thought of more than eighty
nations coming to a consensus was a mere ideal in the distant
future. The ICC encompasses social, economical, and political
ideology of many nations, legal systems, religions and nongov-
ernmental organizations into one international body. We cer-
tainly are a long way from the once bipolar world.
Amnesty International, in a report to its members after the
Rome Conference, established that
[tjhe true significance of the adoption of the Statute may well lie,
not in the actual institution itself in its early years, which will
face enormous obstacles, but in the revolution in legal and moral
attitudes towards the worst crimes in the world. No longer will
these crimes be simply political events to be addressed by diplo-
macy at the international level, but crimes which all states have a
duty to punish themselves or, if they fail to fulfill this duty, by the
international community in accordance with the rule of law. 162
There will be many problems to work out in the upcoming
years, but the establishment of the ICC can be seen and recog-
nized as a positive step towards international peace. It is hoped
that the major superpowers that have yet to sign the treaty,
such as Russia and the United States will soon join the treaty
and bring to the court their own ideas and expectations.
162 Pace, supra note 113 (quoting Amnesty International).
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This comment does not advocate one view of the political
offense doctrine over another, nor does it propose any reform of
the doctrine. The purpose of this comment is to cast light on the
political offense doctrine within the context of the ICC and pro-
claim that, for the foregoing reasons, the doctrine will have no
place, politically, socially or ideologically, in the ICC. The ICC,
a neutral, international judicial body, will not support any of
the political or social rationale that sustain the exception in a
state-to-state forum.
The ICC, absent the political offense doctrine, will actually
cater to both proponents and opponents of the doctrine when
used interstate. For those in support of the doctrine, the ICC
will grant a fair trial with minimal worry of cruel punishment.
Furthermore, states will be able to maintain the appearance of
neutrality to their counterparts via cooperation with the Court.
For those who oppose the exception, the ICC will favor their
ideas while suppressing their fears of the doctrine. The ICC
will deter criminal activity rather than encourage it. The ICC,
therefore, is one place where the abolition of the political offense
doctrine may approach the possibility of making both sides
content.
There is strong debate about the political offense doctrine
in the application of interstate relations, when individual states
are the primary actors in a problem. There are policy reasons
and ideology in favor of and in opposition to the doctrine. No
one nation or view is right or wrong. This debate, however, as
illustrated above, ceases to exist when the focus forum is a neu-
tral, international judicial body. The ICC, or any permanent in-
ternational court, is simply not equipped to entertain the
political offense doctrine.
[Vol. 11:419
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/7
